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Jose Asturias 
Why do Individuals Contribute to Public Radio? 
 
 
Introduction 
The benefits of many public goods—traditionally defined as being non-rival and 
non-excludable—are available to one and all nominally at no expense.  That situation 
notwithstanding, millions of dollars are given voluntarily every year by private citizens to 
support those very services.  
The puzzle has long baffled economists. Why do individuals donate money to 
public goods whose benefits they can equally consume without contributing?  The facts 
do not conform to theories of self-interested utility maximization of individuals.  Clearly, 
any amount donated by an individual out of his finite income is at the expense of his own 
overall consumption.  The resulting reduction in consumption implies a decrease in 
utility, making giving the less attractive of the two choices.  
  Yet, paradoxically, charitable donations are huge: nearly $250 billion, or roughly 
2% of GDP in 2004 (Giving USA, 2005).  Moreover, many institutions, ranging from 
public radio to the Red Cross, depend on this source of income for a large part of   their 
funding. If consumers are not maximizing self-interested utility, then what are they 
maximizing?  This paper addresses the question through data collected in a public radio 
donation drive.  As a non-rival and non-excludable public good that citizens actively 
fund, the institution of public radio offers a unique opportunity to collect data on the 
motivation behind the phenomenon.  
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Background 
Economists have developed a body of literature over the last decades that attempts 
to explain charitable giving.  Conscious that narrowly tying utility to consumption has 
failed to produce a good answer, these studies include other preferences.   
The theory of altruism (Becker, 1974) holds that individuals naturally want to 
improve the well-being of others.  Becker’s model describes a person’s utility function as 
U(x, y) where x measures an individual’s private consumption and y measures the well-
being of recipients of charity.  The person wants to see others in society better off; as a 
result, a rational person will donate when the loss in utility from his reduction in private 
consumption is smaller than the gain in his utility as a result of others increased 
happiness.  Much literature has been written challenging this theory.  Sugden (1982, 
1984) finds properties that contradict empirical findings.  The most glaring problem with 
this model is the implication that if other donors increase their donations, an individual 
will decrease his own donations (see Sugden, 1982, page 346). As described later, a large 
body of empirical analysis contradicts this result. 
 Warm-glow, a alternative theory proposed by Andreoni (1990), asserts that in 
addition to interdependent utility functions, the act of giving increases an individual’s 
utility.  Andreoni’s model describes a person’s utility function as U(x, g, G) where x is 
private consumption, g is the gift to the public good, and G = ∑gi is the total size of the 
public good. This general form also permits two other cases.  The first is when the person 
is purely altruistic and does not care about the gift.  Hence, his utility will be of a form 
U(x, G).  The second is when the person is motivated only by the act of giving, or warm 
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glow.  Hence, the utility will be U(x, g).  If the utility function contains x, g, and G then 
the person is impurely altruistic.   
Andreoni (1995) conducted a laboratory experiment that found that people are 
significantly more willing to donate if appeals are framed as positive externalities and not 
negative externalities.  In other words, individuals are more likely to donate if those who 
request donations focus on the positive results of donating rather than the misfortunes 
that would occur if individual did not donate.  This has implications in favor of the 
“warm-glow” model. The motivation at work, Andreoni notes, cannot be pure altruism, 
for under that theory individuals would behave in the same way regardless of the appeal’s 
positive or negative thrust. He explains, “This indicates that much of the cooperation 
observed in public goods experiments is due to framing, and that the warm-glow of 
creating a positive externality appears to be stronger than the cold-prickle of creating a 
negative externality.”   
Implicit in this analysis is the pivotal role of framing in determining how   
individuals feel about giving and even about whether they experience warm-glow or not.   
The existence of an asymmetry in how people donate depending on the focus of the 
advertising shows the importance of framing.  This shows that individuals receive 
different amounts of enjoyment from donating under different circumstances, with some 
sort of warm-glow phenomenon evidently at work. 
 Other theories concentrate on pro-social behavior focus and conditional 
cooperation—the notion that individuals are more likely to contribute when others 
contribute.  Multiple empirical studies confirm that conditional cooperation strongly 
influences donations.  List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) found that increasing seed money 
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significantly boosted participation rates and average gift size.  More specifically, 
increasing seed money from 10 percent to 67 percent of the campaign goal produced a 
nearly six-fold increase in contributions, with significant effects of both participation 
rates and average gift size.   
Frey and Meier (2004) conducted a field experiment at the University of Zurich 
during an annual fundraiser to benefit student financial aid programs. Some students were 
presented with information that a relatively high percentage of the student population (64 
percent) contributed whereas another group was given information that a relatively low 
percentage had donated (46 percent).  Using a conditional logit model to analyze the 
results, the researchers estimated that a change in expectations from 46 percent to 64 
percent increases the probability of contributing for an individual by around 11.5 
percentage points.   
Shang and Croson (2004a), (2004b), (2005c) and Shang, Croson and Reed (2005)  
confirmed these findings in the context of public radio.  In these series of field 
experiments, operators at a public radio station described donation sizes of prior callers.  
There was also a control group in which the operator did not mention any amount.  The 
studies found that if the amount indicated by the operator was $300 (94 percentile) then 
contributions by new members increased by about $52 or 43% as compared to the control 
group.  Only when the amount in the operator’s prompt was above the 99th percentile, the 
studies found, did individuals not increase their donations.  
This behavior of conditional cooperation is consistent with multiple theoretical 
frameworks.  First, Sugden (1984) proposed the theory of reciprocity.  It rests on the idea 
of “practical morality,” which sustains that individuals attempt to maximize their own 
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consumption only within certain moral bounds.  In this case, it means that an individual 
will feel morally bound to donate to a public good if many other individuals are donating 
as well. 
Rabin (1993) develops another interesting theory that could shed light on this 
“practical morality” of Sugden’s.  Why do individuals feel morally obligated to donate 
when many others are donating?  This theory holds that individuals tend to respond to 
generous acts, even if it is costly to them.  Individuals do not always necessarily want to 
be generous to everyone as Becker’s altruism would suggest.  In short, individuals will 
not be charitable to all; rather, they will do so according to the generosity of the other 
person. 
To some theorists, charity can take the form of a transaction: “you give me 
something nice and I give you something nice back.”  What the donor receives can vary 
widely, and need not take tangible form. It can simply be what we might broadly call a 
service. Its thrust could be practical, emotional, esthetic, etc. Regardless of its form and 
other particulars, it will always be something the recipient enjoys and/or values. Hence, 
we would expect increased donations from increased usage under this theory.  In 
addition, if many others are donating money, then the individual may see this as a gift 
and hence increase his own donations.  Thus, this theory is also consistent with 
reciprocity. 
Transactions can specifically involve an exchange of gifts, a formula analyzed by 
several empirical studies.  Falk (2003) compared contribution levels when  gifts were and 
were not included in letters requesting donations, finding that small gifts increased 
contributions by 17 percent and large ones by 75 percent. This finding,  Falk (2003) 
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notes,  may also shed light on the results found by List and Lucking-Reiley (2002). The 
reason that increasing seed money significantly boosted participation rates and average 
gift size, Falk observes, could be that individuals see seed money as a gift that is 
reciprocated with higher donation rates.  Hence, even under the gift-exchange hypothesis, 
we would still expect to see a higher donation when others increase their own donations 
as well, which is consistent with reciprocity. 
 Another possible theory, that of “social norms” (Bernheim, 1994), may also shed 
light on conditional cooperation.  Because a person’s status within a group is determined 
by his adherence to  its social norms,  Bernheim theorizes that in gift-giving people have 
an eye on their social status in addition to being concerned about the utility they derive 
directly from consumption (the author calls this “intrinsic” utility). Hence, when status is 
sufficiently important relative to “intrinsic” utility, individuals will choose to give up 
some of their own consumption in order to gain social status or avoid chastisement from 
the group. In fact, psychological, anthropological, and sociological research has shown 
that often individuals who do not follow norms will be socially chastised.   
Festinger (1954) proposed the theory of social comparisons, one that is both 
consistent with reciprocity and social norms.  In that theory, people look towards the 
behavior of other people in order to provide information on the appropriate behavior to 
follow.  Once this information has been given, we can expect individuals to gravitate 
towards this behavior.   
Social comparisons appear to be part of a larger phenomenon observed in 
marketing: the “anchor point” or “reference point” (Desmet, and Feinberg, 2003).  
Consumers have been found to avail themselves of anchor points to price products on a 
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relative rather than an absolute basis, thus revealing they want an indication of what they 
ought to pay for a product.  Anchor points can be internal or external.  Internal ones may 
come, for example, from prior experience or some preconceived notion of the consumer, 
while advertising is a common form of the external variant.  
Desmet and Feinberg (2003) conducted a large-scale experiment as part of a 
French charity’s national fundraising campaign to test the existence of these anchor 
points in a fundraising setting.  The researchers manipulated the suggested donation sizes 
listed on solicitations.  They found that different amounts (i.e., anchor points) led to very 
different distribution of donations.  Regardless of whether individuals interpret these 
higher donation sizes as reflecting higher average donations or not, we still see that 
anchor points convey social information (in this case the amount expected from the 
charity), which influences donation sizes. 
Vesterlund (2003) has focused on methods via which contributors identify which 
charities are of a high-enough quality to support. We have 600,000 charities, with an 
additional 30,000 added every year. Because of the sheer numbers involved, the author 
points out, there is a major lack of information regarding most charities. For the public, 
Vesterlund believes, large contributions equal broad-based support, which in turn equal a 
reputation for quality. Thus an organization’s donation-based financing is taken by many 
donors as a reflection of its intrinsic quality.  This can explain the common practice in 
fundraising campaigns of announcing large “leadership” contributions throughout the 
campaign.  In addition, it could explain why many fundraising campaigns begin with a 
low-key effort in order to accumulate some seed money. 
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Potter (2001) conducted a laboratory experiment in order to test this hypothesis.  
In the first setting, only the first donor is given information regarding the quality of the 
public good.  After his donation size is announced,  the other subjects decide how much 
to donate.  Researchers found that subsequent donors tended to follow the size of the first 
donor.  In another experiment, the quality of the public good was announced to 
everybody.  In this setting, announcing the first person’s donation size had no effect on 
subsequent donation levels, showing evidence for the signaling hypothesis. 
 As this short review demonstrates, there are many proposed theories as to why 
individuals donate to public goods. Some can exist parallel to each other, while some are 
mutually exclusive. As more tests are conducted over time we will be able to identify the 
most credible.  
To briefly summarize the ground covered, altruism suggests that an individual 
donates because he receives satisfaction from improving other people’s welfare, while 
warm-glow contends that an individual receives satisfaction from donating.  Other 
theories focus on pro-social behavior and are consistent with conditional cooperation—
that individuals are more likely to donate if others are donating. The exchange theory 
focuses on donations being triggered by the receipt of something the donors values or 
enjoys.  Reciprocity suggests that if many people donate then a person will feel morally 
obligated to donate as well.  A possible explanation may be that individuals try to 
respond to generous acts—if many other people are donating it may be seen as a gift that 
much be reciprocated with a higher donation.  The theory of social norms suggests that in 
some circumstances individuals may give up their own consumption in order to follow a 
social norm.  Hence, the person may donate in order to avoid social chastisement or 
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receive praise from others.  Lastly, the quality hypothesis holds that large donations 
signals that the charity is of high quality. 
 
Goals 
With such a bewildering abundance of theories purporting to explain charitable 
behavior, any chance to test them against actual data is useful.  This study will use survey 
data collected from individuals who gave to public radio in order to test these theories.  
Using a regression, we will assess which theory is most influential in determining 
donation sizes.  From these results, we will be able to see which motivations are borne 
out by the findings, and their importance relative to each other. 
Note should be made that Vesterlund’s “quality” hypothesis (large contributions 
are a way of identifying high-quality organizations) cannot be tested in the setting of 
public radio. On the other hand, it is safe to assume that   public radio donors already 
have all the information they need about it.  As can be seen in the chart below, those who 
donate have listened to public radio for a considerable number of years.  The median 
number of years is 8 and the middle 50% is 5-13 years.  Thus, while this theory does hold 
much potential, it will not be tested in this paper.  
 
Number of Years Listened 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
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Data 
 The data used in this paper was collected during the 2003 annual fundraiser of an 
east coast public radio station.  This survey was enclosed in the renewal package sent to 
all renewing members.  Those who responded filled out the survey at approximately the 
same time that they decided their donation amounts.  These surveys were returned 
directly to the researchers in a separate envelope.  See Appendix I for a copy of the 
survey.  Note that the questions on all surveys were the same; however, the order of the 
questions varied to control for any differences posed by any one ordering.  These 
differences did not turn out to be statistically significant. 
 The survey consisted of two parts.  The first contained 21 questions that tried to 
elicit from the individuals the motivations for donating.  For each listed motivation the 
individual indicated how well it matched his reason for donating by choosing a number 
ranging from 1 (“Not at all”), to 5 (“Very well”).  Each of these questions was tied to a 
specific theory.  For example, “I contribute because it feels good to contribute” attempted 
to identify individuals influenced by warm-glow.  “To increase the quality of the service 
that other listeners get” corresponded to an altruistic motivation.  These questions allow 
researchers to infer motivations for donating. 
 The 14 questions in Part II elicit data about the individual.  Questions including 
listener usage, number of friends and family who also listen to public radio, estimated 
average contribution of other donors, number of other stations listened to, and other 
organizations the person donates to.  Lastly, the donor was asked his sex, age, education, 
ethnicity, zip code, and relationship status in order to control for demographic differences 
across donors. 
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 As an incentive to return the survey, a donation of $5 was promised to the first 
200 responders. There was a response rate of 14%, or 423 individuals.  All the 
information collected from the survey was then linked the individual’s donation history.  
Hence, the dataset contains motivations for donating and the amount donated, in addition 
to demographic data. 
 The advantage of using a survey is that it provides data of different types to test 
many different theories.  Do donation sizes increase as the estimated average donation 
increase as implied by conditional cooperation?  Do individuals with friends that listen 
tend to donate more money, as “social norms” indicates?  These different theories can be 
tested using this survey.  In addition, it allows for the easy collection of demographic data 
to control for other factors.  
 The main criticism of using surveys is the possibility of inaccurate data.  All 
pollsters know that some questions test better than others, for people’s wish to meet 
presumed expectations gets in the way of their truthfulness. For example, in this sample it 
was found that individuals tend to overestimate the amount they donated.  So it seems 
reasonable to assume some inaccurate reporting when data that could be used to “judge” 
the person is being collected.  On the other hand, a large segment of the questions did not 
ask for this kind of data. A person has little reason to lie, for instance, if he is being asked 
for the reasons he contributes.  
 Another potential problem is that of noisy data, which is prevalent in survey 
information.  The results will be that the alternative hypothesis (that a regressor has some 
predictive power) will be rejected too often (see Appendix II).  A possible remedy of this 
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problem may be to use instrument variables, although this issue will not be addressed in 
this paper. 
A much larger concern is whether the sample is iid across individuals.  The fact 
that only 14% of those surveyed responded is not in itself problematic, for national 
election polls estimate the voting patters of over 100 million people using a sample of 
only a couple hundred persons.  The question is whether the 14% that responded is 
representative of the contributors to public radio. One possible way in which to address 
this issue is to compare the demographic of those who responded to the survey and the 
general donating population.  This analysis would give a fairly good idea if there is a very 
large bias. 
That said, the limited participation in this survey places some restrictions on its 
uses. The small number of people questioned in national polls is chosen by the pollsters, 
while here the participants selected themselves. What distortions this fact might cause are 
impossible to predict.  Despite this problem, there is still much insight we can still glean 
from this data.  
  
General Description of Participant Data 
Approximately 75% of individuals indicated an age between 35 and 54.  Over 
90% attended college and 77% graduated.  96% identified themselves as white.  
Individuals reported listening an average of 3 hours per day and tuning in to an average 
of 1.8 other stations. The average and median donation sizes over three years (actual 
donations, not self-reported) were $109 and $82.  The average and median of the 
estimated donation of other contributors were $83 and $67.  In addition, the average 
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individual knew 6 others who listened.  However, the average individual only knew 1.5 
other people who actually contributed.  
 
Preparing for the Regression 
The aim of this project is understand the motivations for individuals to donate to 
public radio.  Using a regression, we can assess which types of individuals tend to donate 
money to public radio while controlling for many factors.  We will regress average 
contributions (actual contributions, not self-reported) on the questions from the survey. 
One of the first issues was choosing the dependent variable of the regression.  The 
average 3 year contribution of the individual was chosen. By taking the average over 3 
years, we ensured that the data provided a more accurate view of the person’s donation 
patterns that just taking the latest year’s donation size.  Implicit in this assumption is that 
the person donates a certain mean plus epsilon where epsilon is a random term, with 
mean zero.  By taking the average over a couple of years we have a better idea of the true 
average.  
Next, it was necessary to choose the independent variables.  The data from the 
first half of the survey, the part that asked the individual to rate different reasons for 
donating 1-5, could be handled in two potential ways.  The first was to simply let each 
question be a dependent variable.  The second method was to create indexes for each 
motivation.  In the survey, there were some questions that were worded differently but 
corresponded to the same motivation.  Using a correlation table and the survey one could 
identify which questions tapped into the same psychological motivation. An index could 
then be created taking the average response corresponding to each motivation.   
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This first method was used instead of the second.  It seemed that taking the 
average of these measures to create the index arbitrarily assigned weights to them.  If 
there were two questions that corresponded to one theory, then each one received a 50% 
weight without taking into account any intrinsic or statistical reason.  In addition, by 
running a regression on all the responses, only the strongest overall variables would 
remain in the regression, providing a more accurate measure. 
The other dependent variables were the remaining questions asked in the survey, 
including data about the number of friends/family members who listen, usage data, and 
demographic data.  
Some steps needed to be taken in order to prepare the data for the regression.  
First, it was necessary to transform the data when necessary to remove outliers and to 
create a normal distribution.  This was done by logging the average 3 year contribution 
(the dependent variable) and average amount given to other two charities (an independent 
variable).  These transformations can be seen in the graphs below.  
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        BEFORE TRANSFORMATION          AFTER TRANSFORMATION 
Ave 3 Yr Contribution 
0 100 300 500 700 900
 
Log(Ave 3 Yr 
Contribution) 
3 4 5 6 7
 
Average Other two 
charities 
0 1000 2000 3000 4000
 
Log(Average other two 
charities) 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
 
 
In addition the term “average amount given to other two charities” also had one 
extreme outlier that posed a problem despite the log transformation.  In order to avoid the 
potential skewing of our results, that one data point was removed from the regression. 
Furthermore, the raw data that came from the first part of the survey was 
problematic; simply entering the data into the regression would have ignored that some 
individuals tended to give higher marks to all motivations than others.  Hence, to correct 
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for this problem, the average mark for each individual was calculated and then all the 
responses were subtracted from this average.  In this manner, all individuals’ marks were 
“standardized” to make interpretation possible. 
One criticism of this method may be that it only preserves the ordering of 
preferences but not necessarily the intensity of those preferences.  For example, two 
individuals may have the same “standardized” preferences but different levels of 
intensity.  Under this method they would both appear to be identical, resulting in a 
problem that cannot easily be overcome.  The problem comes from the fact that it is hard, 
if not impossible, to distinguish between the intensity of these emotions and the arbitrary 
response tendencies of each person.  Hence, it is argued that the only information that can 
be extracted from the data is the relative ranking of these preferences. 
 
Regression Output 
In order to arrive at the regression, the Log (three year average contribution) was 
regressed on all of the answers from the survey.  All factors that were insignificant at the 
5% level were removed. 
Another important fact to note is that the correlation among the regressors is fairly 
low (see Appendix IV).  In fact, the highest correlation is 0.25, which does not show 
much cause for concern. 
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Goodness of Fit 
R2        0.313 
R2 Adjusted       0.288  
 
Conditional Cooperation     Coefficient St. Error 
Estimated average donation      0.0057  (0.0011) 
 
Social Norms 
Because friends donate     -0.084  (0.041) 
I like others seeing my logo merchandise   -0.113   (0.034) 
I feel obligated      -0.066  (0.030) 
 
Altruism 
Listeners same quality     -0.069  (0.032) 
 
Transactional 
Thank you gifts         0.076  (0.029) 
Number of other stations     -0.110  (0.029) 
To make sure that I will get the same quality service -0.093  (0.035)  
 
Warm Glow 
Log (Average donation to other charities)    0.185  (0.026) 
 
Other Controls 
Female       -0.219  (0.067) 
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Using the outlined strategy above yielded a regression with an adjusted R2 of 
0.288.  This is a fairly high R2 considering that this is cross sectional data.  Hence, a 
fairly significant portion of the variation in donation sizes can be explained by the 
answers from the survey. 
One of the most significant factors of the regression is the estimated average 
donation.  The correct interpretation of this coefficient is that an increase of $1 in the 
estimated average donation implies a (100*0.0057)% change in the average 3 year 
contribution, where 0.0057 is the term’s coefficient.  Suppose that an individual donates 
$100 and believes that the average donation is also $100.  If his estimated average 
donation increases by $1 to $101, he will on average done $0.57 more.  This term is 
extremely significant (p < 0.01) shows much explanatory power.  This result confirms 
theories of conditional cooperation in which individuals are more likely to contribute if 
they think that others are contributing as well.1 
Another interesting finding is that social norms proved to be a relatively weak 
influencer of donation sizes, reflected by the negative coefficients in the regression. It is 
important to note that negative coefficients should not be interpreted as a motivation 
having negative influence on an absolute scale.  The scores for each motivation were 
“standardized” and are hence a measure people’s preferences on a relative basis.  The 
correct interpretation of a negative coefficient is that those who are influenced by a 
certain motivation tend to donate less money than those who prefer other motivations.  
Hence, those individuals who ranked highly the questions relating to social norms tended 
to donate less money on average than those who ranked it low.  In addition, the fact that 
                                                 
1 Another possible explanation is that individuals use their own contributions to estimate 
the contributions of others.  This issue was addressed by Frey and Meier (2004), p. 1717. 
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all three of these measures were negative provides more compelling evidence for this 
conclusion.   
This conclusion seems to be consistent with the environment in which public 
radio operates. Its listeners are scattered throughout the region, making it difficult to 
establish social penalties for deviating from the norm.  In fact, as indicated earlier, the 
average individual indicated knowing 6 people who listened but only 1.5 people who 
contributed.  In this case, the average individual knows more people who did not donate 
than otherwise.  A perception of social penalties for non-giving is doubtful. 
Another possibility may be the presence of a positive element--that individuals do 
not get penalized for not donating but receive praise for donating.  As the average 
contributor knows of only 6 other individuals who listen, this seems unlikely.  It still 
leaves an extremely large percentage of people who may not even know about public 
radio.  This fact is confirmed by the significant and negative term for the response: 
“because I like others seeing my logo merchandise.”  This motivation of social norms 
may be stronger in “sexier” charities that are supported by movie stars and famous 
musicians.  Conceivably, wearing a shirt from a Bono-supported charity is likelier to 
garner praise than wearing a bag with a public radio logo. 
The fact that “social norms” does not seem to be a powerful influencer in public 
radio donations is confirmed by the average scores to the motivations: “because my 
friends contribute” and “because I like it when other people see my logo merchandise.”  
As can be seen in Appendix III their average scores were 1.58 and 1.75 respectively, and 
the average mark was 3.23.  We can see that most donors do not consider this to be a 
major factor in donating. 
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The term that corresponded to altruism was also negative.  Again, this means that 
individuals who rated altruism highly tended to donate less money, showing that high 
levels of altruism do not greatly increase donation sizes.  This fact is consistent with past 
literature showing this theory to be inconsistent with empirical data. 
Another theory tested was whether charity could be seen as a transaction or as an 
exchange of gifts.  The term for thank you gifts came out to be positive, showing that 
those highly motivated by the receipt of a gift tended to donate more. By the same token, 
in such an exchange, two transactions are at play. That donation could, in theory, be 
divided into the amount being given in exchange for use of the service, and that being 
offered in exchange for the gift. The first can be thought of as traditional exchange, while 
in the second the donor is paying a certain amount for the merchandise. One way to see 
how much money donors are paying for the gift itself would be to remove the presents 
and see how much the people then donate.   
 The number of stations that the individual listened to also showed a negative 
coefficient, meaning that those who listened to more stations donated less money.  This is 
also consistent with charity as a transaction. The less sense donors had of receiving a 
meaningful service from public radio, the less they gave, and visa versa. We can interpret 
the number of stations an individual listens to as a proxy for the value that he places on 
public radio: the more stations a person listens to, the less he values public radio.  Under 
the transaction hypothesis if he values public radio less he will see his consumption as a 
smaller gift, hence donating less.  
Both of these results are consistent with Falk’s (2003) view of charity as gift 
exchange.  In Falk’s study for example, it was seen that if small gifts were enclosed in 
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solicitations for donations, people were be more likely to give money.  In our current 
case, individuals received the “gift” of being able to listen to public radio.  Donors gave a 
gift in return to the radio station.  Lastly, the radio station gave the donor a gift for their 
contribution. 
The last significant term with a transactional aspect is the motivation, “To make 
sure that I will get the same quality service.”  Again, the negative coefficient indicates 
that those who rated this highly relative to other motivations did not donate as much 
money.  This result appears to be logical since contributors know that their contribution 
alone is not going to raise the quality of service.  Hence, seeing donations as a transaction 
in this sense—a person donates in the belief that they will receive higher quality in 
exchange—does not hold up intuitively or in the data.  
The term with the most explanatory power in the regression was the individual’s 
average donations to other charities.  As stated previously, it was necessary to transform 
the average donation to other charities in order to remove the outliers and create a normal 
distribution.  Because both independent and dependent variable are log-transformed, a 
1% change in average donation to two other charities results in 0.185% change in average 
3 year contribution, where 0.185 is the coefficient of the term.  Take the example of a 
person who donates $100 to public radio and $100 on average to two other charities.  For 
every $1 increase in average donation to the two other charities, the person will increase 
his donation to public radio by $0.185.  We know that this term could either account for 
wealth or some measure of warm glow. 
Thus, the next step is to determine the extent to which this term proxies for 
wealth.  Indeed, it would be expected that individuals who contribute to more charities 
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will also tend to be wealthier, for two reasons.  The first is the result of the progressive 
tax structure in which wealthier people pay higher taxes on their marginal income.  In 
addition, we would expect that those who have more resources tend to donate more 
money, while individuals who can only afford basic necessities will be unable to donate   
towards public goods. 
There were several possible approaches in order to control for wealth.  The first 
occurred in the regression; demographic factors such as education are highly correlated 
with earnings.  However, education was not a significant factor in the regression (p-value 
= 0.52).  The second attempt was through the use of the person’s ZIP code in order to 
determine the average income of the neighborhood--and by extension its individual 
residents--as provided by the US Census Bureau. However, this factor also proved 
insignificant when included in the regression.  Below is a scatter plot of the transformed 
average 3 year contribution and the per capita income of the neighborhood by ZIP code.  
The best-fit line has a slope of 0.00000543 and the R squared is 0.000122, showing that 
the average wealth of the neighborhood has no bearing on donation size.  In a last attempt 
to control for income, an average income was determined for each person based on their 
level education and gender from US Census Bureau data.  As before, there was no 
significant relationship between wealth and contribution size (p-value = 0.67). 
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Linear Fit 
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Summary of Fit 
  
Rsquare 0.000122
RSquare Adj -0.00252
Root Mean Square Error 0.591212
Mean of Response 4.474259
Observations (or Sum 
Wgts) 
380
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t|
Intercept  4.4535062 0.101136 44.03 <.0001
Per Capita 
Income 
 5.43e-7 0.000003 0.22 0.8298
 
 
Hence, we can conclude that wealth does not play a role in determining donation 
sizes.  This seems plausible given that the relatively small contributions do not 
significantly change rich donors’ tax bills.  Additionally, one may safely infer that public 
radio’s preponderantly college-educated donors are middle class Americans whose 
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income makes donations possible. Hence, it appears that this measures some propensity 
to donate or the warm glow of the individual. 
At the same time, altruism fails as an explanation, for under that theory donation 
sizes are contingent on income.  As income increases, the marginal benefit of money goes 
down, while the marginal benefit of donating money remains the same.  Hence, we would 
expect income to be positively correlated with donation size-- which is not the case. 
 
Caveats 
 
 One basic consideration when interpreting these results is the absence of   
information on non-donors.  It is almost certain that some regressors emerged as 
insignificant in determining donation size only because of the lack of non-donor 
information.  In Appendix III we can see the average score for each question as well as 
the standard deviation. The motivation “because I listen” received an average score of 
4.80, meaning that virtually everybody listed this as a motivation.  However, because 
there is very little variance in the data this factor did not come out to be significant.  On 
the other hand, if information of non-donors had been included, there would be much 
more variance in the response to this question.  Hence, we see that the lack of inclusion 
of non-donors made certain regressors unlikely to show up as significant. Other factors 
such as wealth and level of education may prove to be significant once non-donors are 
included. 
 Another set of data is not included in our information: the arguments made during 
the relevant pledge drive to appeal to donors’ wallets. Common sense, combined with our 
own familiarity with pledge drives, suggests that every sort of pitch imaginable was made 
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at some point during the multi-day activity. Surely the need to fill a large number of 
hours of air-time with an essentially brief, unchanging message must create a sui generis 
set of exigencies and even a certain amount of creative desperation. Still, the many 
obstacles to collecting the data aside, it would have been interesting to correlate the 
relationship between the various arguments in the station’s presentation, and the relative 
weight of each, to the donors’ subsequent data. It is not inconceivable that difference in 
emphasis of on the various motivations could create at least somewhat different results.  
 Another factor to keep in mind, as stated earlier, is the distinction between a 
charity like public radio and those which do not offer a good or service for the donor’s 
active “consumption.”  The motivations of donors for tsunami relief charities, for 
example,   will always be somewhat different than that of public radio’s contributors. In 
the former, the transactional aspect would be absent, for no gift or direct service is at 
issue; conversely, we would expect urges like altruism to be much stronger. The pictures 
of starving children, conceivably, would activate a person’s altruism in a way that an 
appeal from public radio cannot achieve. 
 
Further Research 
 
 The gift-transactional aspect of donations would be an interesting area to explore 
further.  In this “transaction” an individual receives public radio and a free gift in 
exchange for a donation.  As indicated earlier, it would be interesting to decompose the 
value of the donation into the amount donated because of receiving public radio and the 
free gift, so as to better understand the effectiveness of free gifts for fundraising.  
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 Also useful—on both an academic and a practical level—would to develop a 
more complete model of how individuals change their donations when their expectations 
of others’ donations change. While donors, as we have seen, tend to make donations in 
line with the gift-giving of others, in fact their perceptions about others’ giving is 
substantially underestimated.  The average and median donation sizes (actual donations, 
not self-reported) were $109 and $82.  The average and median of the estimated donation 
of other contributors were $83 and $67.  Hence, the result of that research could give 
guidance to public radio on increasing income  by merely changing perceptions of the 
average donation.  In addition, if public radio could somehow raise these perceptions, it 
would give researchers a natural occurring instance in which expectations are 
exogenously changing. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Much has been written about the puzzle of why individuals contribute to public 
goods, paying for something they can obtain for free. Various theories, which range from 
complementary to exclusionary in their inter-relationship, have been proposed.  This 
paper explores donors’ motivations by using data supplied by contributors themselves, 
via a public radio survey.    
The answers reveal distinct patterns. Public radio’s typical donor has a long-
standing relationship with the station and is an “active consumer” of its “product.” The 
notion of   “exchange” is a big motivator in their gift-giving.  Very strong support exists 
for “conditional cooperation”--individuals donate more willingly if they perceive others 
are doing so as well. The “warm-glow” factor had evident appeal as well.  The data 
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reflected, at the same time, which motivators were less influential. The “social norm” 
factor, for example, does not seem to be nearly as strong as the ones cited earlier.  This is 
not surprising, given that most listeners know few people who donate, making it difficult 
to establish social penalties for not donating. It is also consistent with a picture that 
emerges of donors giving because of their perceived personal relationship with the 
station, and not because of what others may think.  
There is a limit to the information that can be gleaned from one study. At the 
same time, research has a way of identifying new questions even as it provides answers to 
old ones. There is more to be explored, and this paper has touched on some interesting 
possibilities.  Still, we have gathered important insights into the character and 
motivations of public radio listeners, a fact which will be of tremendous importance both 
to the institution of public radio itself and to others with a comparable function.  . 
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Appendix I 
 
August 2003 Survey
In order to measure the effectiveness of this fund-raising effort, you are invited to join in
a study conducted by Professor Rachel Croson from the University of P ennsylvania. If
you could spend 5 minutes filling out this survey and send it back in the yellow self-
addressed envelope by Oct. 15, 2003, this station will receive an add itional contribution
of $5 from the survey group for each of the first 200 surveys returned. Note that your
membership renewal and this survey should be returned in two separate envelopes.
Thank you for your participation!
 1  Why do you contribute to public radio? Please circle one of the five numbers for each
reason to indicate how well they describe why you contribute. Number “1” represents
“ not at all” and number “5” represents “very well”.
I contribute …
         Not at all
Very well
Because I listen 1 2 3 4 5
Because it feels good to contribute 1 2 3 4 5
To make sure other listeners will get the same quality service 1 2 3 4 5
To make sure that I will get the same quality service 1 2 3 4 5
Because other people I know (e.g. friends, colleagues) contribute 1 2 3 4 5
So I do not feel guilty when I listen 1 2 3 4 5
To increase the quality of the service that other listeners get 1 2 3 4 5
Because I want to do my share 1 2 3 4 5
Because I like the thank you gifts provided 1 2 3 4 5
Because I want to set an example for other listeners 1 2 3 4 5
Because I want to set an example for my children 1 2 3 4 5
Because public radio is important in my life 1 2 3 4 5
Because I believe other funding sources are not sufficient 1 2 3 4 5
Because I want to help others 1 2 3 4 5
To prevent the station from going off the air 1 2 3 4 5
Because I believe that other listeners contribute 1 2 3 4 5
Because it is the right thing to do 1 2 3 4 5
Because I feel obliged to contribute 1 2 3 4 5
Because the staff works hard to provide the service 1 2 3 4 5
To increase the quality of the service I get 1 2 3 4 5
Because I like it when other people see my logo merchandise 1 2 3 4 5
 2   In what year did you first start listening?              
 3  For how many hours (approximately) have you listened each day during the past year?
Jose Asturias 
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 5    If you listen to stations other than this one, please list the top other three stations:
(leave the lines blank, if you do not listen to other stations either on the radio or online)
1.                                  2.                                  3.                                 
 6    What is your closest estimate of the average contribution of members?
?  < $ 50 ?  $ 60 - $74 ?  $ 75 - $99 ?  $100  -
$124
?  $125 –  $ 179 ?  $ 180 - $239 ?  $ 240 - $ 360 ?  Other        
            
 7    How many people do you know who  listen to this station?
Family Members  ?  no one ?  1 person ?  2 peop le ?  3 peop le ?
Other    
Co-workers      ?  no one ?  1 person ?  2 peop le ?  3 peop le ?
Other    
Friends      ?  no one ?  1 person ?  2 peop le ?  3 peop le ?
Other    
 8    How many people do you know who  contribute to this station?
Family Members  ?  no one ?  1 person ?  2 peop le ?  3 peop le ?
Other    
Co-workers      ?  no one ?  1 person ?  2 peop le ?  3 peop le ?
Other    
Friends      ?  no one ?  1 person ?  2 peop le ?  3 peop le ?
Other    
 9    What is your sex? ?  Male ?  Female
 10   What is your age?
?  18 – 24 years ?  25 – 29 years ?  30 – 34 years ?  35  – 44
years
?  45 – 54 years ?  55 – 64 years ?  65 – 74 years ?  75 yea rs or
over
 11   What is the highest level of formal education you have  completed?
?  Grade 8 or less ?  Grade 9-11 years ?  Graduated high
school
?  1-3 years of college ?  4 year college degree ?  S ome graduate
credits
?  Advanced degree (MA, MD, PHD)
 12   Please indicate the category which best describes yourself
?  Hispanic/Latino ?  Black/African American ?  A sian/Pacific
Islander
?  White/Caucasian ?  Native American/Indian
?  Mixed/Other (Please write in)                                             
 13   Please indicate your relationship status?
?  Now married ? Widowed ?  Divorced ? Separated
Jose Asturias 
 
Appendix II 
 
Proof that measurement error will results in over-rejection of the alternative hypothesis: 
 
Suppose that  
 
Yi = B0 + B1 * xi + Ui  
 
is the true relationship that we are trying to estimate.  Now suppose that instead of xi, we 
only have  
 
xi’= xi + Vi 
 
which represents “noisy” data.  Hence, with this noisy data we will tend to estimate 
 
Yi = A0 + A1 * xi’ + Ui 
 
which using OLS implies that 
 
 ∑ Yi xi – N * Mean (Y) * Mean (xi’) 
Â1 = ---------------------------------------------- 
  ∑ xi’ – N * Mean (xi’)^2 
 
which converges in probability to 
 
B1 * σx^2 
-----------------   <  B1 
σx^2 + σx’^2 
 
Hence, with noisy data, which is the case for surveys, we will tend to consider more 
regressors insignificant than we should. 
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Appendix III 
 
Question Average St. Dev.
Because I want to help others 2.93 1.25
increase other's quality 2.69 1.22
Listeners Same Quality 2.82 1.28
Because I want to set an example to others 2.83 1.35
To make sure that I will get the same quality service 3.78 1.15
To prevent the station from going off the air 4.27 1.00
Because the staff works hard to provide the service 3.82 1.11
Because it is important in my life 4.19 0.91
Because I like the thank you gifts 2.65 1.20
Because my friends contribute 1.58 0.91
Because I believe that other listeners contribute 2.54 1.26
Because I like it when other people see my logo merchandise 1.75 1.08
Because I want to do my share 4.25 0.83
Because I feel obliged to contribute 2.98 1.26
Funding not sufficient 3.47 1.13
Because it is the right thing to do 3.98 1.04
So I do not feel guilty when I listen 2.55 1.28
To increase the quality of the service I get 3.03 1.26
Because I listen 4.80 0.55
Because it feels good to contribute 3.71 1.08
Average 3.23 1.11
Question Average St. Dev.
Because I want to help others -0.31 0.96
increase other's quality -0.55 0.92
Listeners Same Quality -0.42 0.99
Because I want to set an example to others -0.39 1.07
To make sure that I will get the same quality service 0.54 0.92
To prevent the station from going off the air 1.01 0.92
Because the staff works hard to provide the service 0.58 0.86
Because it is important in my life 0.94 0.84
Because I like the thank you gifts -0.59 1.08
Because my friends contribute -1.64 0.84
Because I believe that other listeners contribute -0.69 1.01
Because I like it when other people see my logo merchandise -1.47 0.96
Because I want to do my share 1.01 0.76
Because I feel obliged to contribute -0.24 1.14
Funding not sufficient 0.23 1.05
Because it is the right thing to do 0.73 0.90
So I do not feel guilty when I listen -0.67 1.16
To increase the quality of the service I get -0.19 1.03
Because I listen 1.53 0.74
Because it feels good to contribute 0.46 0.88
Average -0.01 0.95
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Appendix IV 
 
Question6: Est_ Average Log(Average other two) Gender Other_Stations Thank you Gifts Listeners Same Quality I same Quality Friends Like LOGO obliged 
Question6: Est_ Average 1.00
Log(Average other two) -0.12 1.00
Gender -0.09 -0.23 1.00
Other_Stations 0.05 0.06 -0.19 1.00
Thank you Gifts 0.08 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 1.00
Listeners Same Quality 0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.01 -0.08 1.00
I same Quality -0.06 0.01 -0.06 0.02 -0.12 0.15 1.00
Friends 0.05 0.05 -0.17 -0.03 0.19 -0.06 -0.25 1.00
Like LOGO 0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.03 0.23 -0.10 -0.17 0.22 1.00
obliged -0.01 0.09 -0.13 0.13 -0.13 -0.26 -0.21 -0.11 -0.05 1.00
 
 
 
 
  
